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Mining the Gap: Physically Integrated Performance and 
Kinesthetic Empathy
Wanda Strukus
At the core of the theatrical experience we find, always, the relationship 
between audience and performer. Historically, we have used varying approaches 
to interrogate this relationship, such as phenomenology, semiotics, and 
performance studies, and seized upon different terms to mark its existence, 
including intersubjectivity, identification, standing-in, projection, and empathy. 
Interdisciplinary studies in theatre and cognitive science provide yet another 
approach for delving into this issue. 
Due, in part, to a hypothesized link between empathy, the human mirror 
neuron system, and autism, the question of how we come to understand one 
another in the world has received a great deal of attention within the cognitive 
science community. The resulting studies and findings offer alternative tools 
for understanding kinds of empathies in performance. In reciprocal fashion, 
performance offers controlled circumstances through which to examine empathy, 
especially if we consider the performance event as a potential site for empathic 
practice. Empathy is a broad term, encompassing a wide range of the possible ways 
in which we understand one another. The narrow focus of this essay is kinesthetic 
empathy, conceptualized as an automatic, involuntary, kinesthetic response of 
one body to another.1 The concept of kinesthetic empathy is problematic because 
early applications seemed to promote universalist assumptions about response 
and experience while neglecting a host of cultural, historical, and contextual 
differences.2 Today, we acknowledge that the factors that shape our ability to 
understand or connect with one another are numerous and complex. In this essay, 
I propose that cultural and historic factors are shaped and reshaped by embodied 
experience, and that the unconscious, neural foundations of kinesthetic empathy 
exist in a dynamic and influential relationship to these other forces. 
Kinesthetic empathy is the feeling of sharing another person’s movement, 
or vicariously experiencing another person’s movement simply by watching, 
and it is the focus of much current interdisciplinary work in dance and cognitive 
science.3 The modern conceptualization of kinesthetic empathy is attributed 
to the philosopher Theodore Lipps and his 1908 essay “Einfühlung, innere 
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Nachahmung und Organempfindung” (“Empathy, Inner Imitation, and Physical 
Sensation”). In this essay, Lipps examines the phenomenon of internally 
imitating the actions of another person simply by observing her, with a particular 
focus on kinesthetic feeling or muscular tension.4 “Einfühlung,” which David 
Freedberg and Vittorio Gallese translate perhaps more accurately as “in-feeling” 
or “feeling into,” had been previously used by philosopher Robert Vischer in 
1873 to describe the viewer’s physical and kinesthetic response when observing 
a painting.5 Both Vischer and Lipps identified the shared kinesthetic experience 
we now call kinesthetic empathy.6 This shared experience has influenced dance 
theory and criticism since the early twentieth century due to dance critic John 
Martin’s adoption and advancement of the concept.7 Kinesthetic empathy is now 
of particular interest to the primary investigators of The Watching Dance Project, 
including cognitive scientist Christian Keysers and dance theorist Dee Reynolds, 
who study the empathic connections between audience and performer.  However, 
the underlying concepts of kinesthetic empathy appear regularly in the work of 
cognitive scientists such as Vittorio Gallese, who focus on wider applications of 
empathy, the mirror neuron system, and embodied cognition.
Not all performance hinges on kinesthetic empathy or on an audience 
member’s ability to put herself in the place of the performer (or performer-as-
character). There are certainly some kinds of performances, however, in which 
the forging of this empathic connection is the primary goal. In this essay, I look 
at AXIS Dance Company, an Oakland, California-based, physically integrated 
dance company that was founded in 1987. As a physically integrated company, 
AXIS incorporates many differently-abled dancers, and the core company has 
always included wheelchair dancers. In this respect, AXIS is representative of 
many physically integrated dance and dance-theatre companies in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Europe that include both wheelchair 
dancers and non-wheelchair dancers. AXIS’s goals include redefining dance and 
making it accessible to all, and changing the way an audience thinks about dance 
and the possibilities of the human body.8 Implicit in these goals is a need to make 
a profound connection with the audience, a connection I cautiously identify as 
kinesthetic empathy.
A physically integrated performance that includes both disabled and 
nondisabled performers presents a lived-body experience on stage that may 
differ significantly from the lived-body experience of nondisabled audience 
members.9 The purpose of physically integrated performance is not always/only a 
sociopolitical one. However, most physically integrated companies are interested 
in reducing rather than reinforcing the oppositional and essentialist distinctions 
of disabled and nondisabled, and rewriting what disability theorist Petra Kuppers 
calls nondisabled certainties and narratives about disability.10 The composition of 
these companies, featuring performers of different physical abilities, contributes 
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to this reduction and rewriting effort, but the critical element in the process is the 
way the audience engages with the performers in the moment of the performance. 
My premise in this essay is that the experience of watching performers 
with different physical abilities can contribute to changing our perceptions 
about physical difference. This is not a radical premise, as it is the same one 
that underlies many physically integrated performances; watching performance 
involves a level of engagement and exchange that can modify our relationship 
to the people we are watching. I am not suggesting that watching alone changes 
perception, or that any such change is uncomplicated or instantaneous. Nor am I 
suggesting that nonconscious neural activity magically leads to a connection with 
another person. Gallese, an early discoverer of mirror neurons and a proponent of 
their role in empathy, notes, “Neurons are not epistemic agents. The only things 
neurons ‘know’ about the world are the ions constantly flowing through their 
membranes.”11 The way we understand one another is a multifaceted cognitive 
process. However, I am suggesting that there is a fundamental, automatic, 
kinesthetic way of experiencing or trying to experience similarity and difference, 
and our understanding of such foundational processes can be valuable in changing 
our perceptions. 
As noted earlier, relationships between individuals of different physical 
abilities are shaped by a host of factors. Social, cultural, and historical practices 
and beliefs result from conscious cognitive processes that become so habitual 
and engrained that they become or seem to become unconscious processes. The 
processes hypothetically involved in kinesthetic empathy are unconscious and 
automatic, but may also influence individually held beliefs and practices by either 
upholding or overturning them. The performance space offers a kind of laboratory 
in which people of different physical abilities can gather to perform and watch 
performance. This “laboratory” is not isolated from the outside world, and we 
bring our previously held assumptions to bear on what we see and do. There 
is, however, a hypothesis at work here: in this space, there is the opportunity to 
temporarily bracket those assumptions to allow something else to happen. This 
essay is about that something else.  
Mirror Mechanisms and Their Relationship to Kinesthetic Empathy
Cognitive explanations for the phenomenological experience of kinesthetic 
empathy begin with the human mirror neuron system. Mirror neurons were 
first discovered in the macaque monkey. These neurons are activated when the 
monkey executes a goal-oriented movement and when the monkey observes 
another monkey (or person) performing the same movement. Further tests using 
fMRI showed that analogous brain regions of human beings expressed similar 
patterns of behavior. Some areas of the human premotor and parietal cortices 
are active when executing an action and when observing someone else execute 
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the same action. Until quite recently the existence of actual mirror neurons in 
human beings was anticipated but hypothetical. But in early 2010, Roy Mukamel 
et al. recorded a significant number of individual neurons that responded to both 
action execution and observation in the human supplementary motor area and 
the hippocampus and environs.12 This “direct, electrophysiological evidence” of 
human individual mirror neurons was made possible through the cooperation of 
patients with severe, intractable epilepsy who were undergoing tests that involved 
placing electrodes in their supplementary motor area (SMA).13 Through this 
electrode placement, Mukamel was able to record activity from 1,177 individual 
cells. While most data about mirroring systems in human beings will continue 
to be limited to the more hypothetical information available through fMRI, the 
documentation of individual neurons with mirroring capabilities provides studies 
of the human mirror neuron system with a more concrete foundation and reframes 
the human mirror neuron system as actual rather than speculative.14
Observations about the mirror neuron system have led to the hypothesis 
that our understanding of the inner state of others depends, in part, on implicit 
motor simulation; when we see someone do something, we automatically 
activate motor impulses that we would use to do that same action ourselves. This 
hypothesis has led Christian Keysers et. al to conceptualize the premotor cortex 
not as a “private fort of our own actions but [rather] a shared arena in which 
our actions and those of others can coexist.”15 Keysers’s work has focused on 
mirroring activity that potentially occurs in areas other than the premotor cortex. 
The somatosensory cortex, associated with touch, and the insula, associated with 
emotion and the physical expression of emotion, may also function as shared 
arenas for the experiences of self and others. Keysers’s hypotheses are based only 
on fMRI studies and are in no way definitive. His observations that areas of the 
somatosensory cortex that respond to touching (BA2) and being touched (SII) 
also seem to respond when we watch the actions of touching or being touched, 
however, suggest that the vicarious experience of touching/being touched may be 
another way in which we understand others.16
Mirroring behavior seems to be an integral part of human and primate brain 
activity, although the quality and degree of mirroring seems to vary greatly among 
individuals. Movement studies conducted by Beatriz Calvo-Merino and Daniel 
Glaser have examined such variables as expert movers (professional dancers) 
versus nonexperts, previously practiced movements versus unfamiliar movements, 
and gender specific dance movements versus dance movements performed by 
both genders equally. The results of these studies suggest that our mirroring 
mechanisms respond more vigorously to movements that we are familiar with 
and, in particular, movements that we have previously executed. There is also 
the suggestion that with regard to movements that are gender-coded mirroring 
mechanisms respond more vigorously when the observer and the executer of the 
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movements are the same sex.17 
Keysers also observed varying responses to stimuli in the somatosensory 
cortex. In a study that involved watching images of an athlete breaking his leg, one 
third of the participants reported feeling vicarious pain in their own limb while the 
remaining two-thirds of the participants felt a generally negative feeling, but no 
pain. The degree and kind of feeling that the participants reported was supported 
by observations of fMRI brain activity. Those who felt vicarious pain had activity 
in SI and SII of the somatosensory cortex and those who did not feel pain did 
not.18
It is not surprising to suggest that some people are more empathic than oth-
ers. While Keysers’s studies are preliminary, thus far his data suggest, “[M]ore 
empathic people show stronger activation than less empathic people when they 
perceive the actions of others, synaesthetes who feel the sensations of others acti-
vate their somatosensory cortices more strongly than non synaesthetes, and lesions 
in the somatosensory cortices impair our capacity to feel the emotions of oth-
ers.”19 The experience of kinesthetic empathy, and perhaps all forms of empathy, 
depends on both the stimuli and on the nature of the perceiver. 
This essay is not the place to consider in detail the factors that might make 
a person more or less empathic, but it is important to acknowledge that our 
individual tendency (if not capacity) for kinesthetic empathy varies widely, and 
that this variation is yet another difference in the room when we are watching a 
performance. People who dance or frequently attend dance performances most 
likely have or have developed a stronger kinesthetically empathic connection 
to dance movements, just as an athlete, or a person who frequently watches 
sporting events, may have or have developed a stronger kinesthetically empathic 
connection to certain athletic movements. Past kinesthetic experience as well as 
social and cultural influences will play a role in shaping these neural tendencies. 
While some individuals may be predisposed to feelings of kinesthetic empathy, 
a premise of this essay and of physically integrated performance is that such 
feelings and awareness can also be developed.
The Nature of This Exploration
Physically integrated dance that incorporates wheelchair dancers confronts 
a societal challenge that is kinesthetic and phenomenological on one hand, and 
culturally and historically engrained on the other. For the wheelchair user, the 
wheelchair is incorporated into the body schema as an integral part of the lived 
body that one moves from and through. For the non-wheelchair user, the wheelchair 
may be an object or a piece of equipment that a person is in or on, separate from the 
body itself and symbolic of disability.20 “Body schema” refers to a representation 
of the body that is produced by proprioceptive, vestibular, somatosensory and 
visual information and is used by the brain to control bodily movements.21 The 
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body schema is dynamic and constantly updated, accommodating the changes 
that occur to the body over time. Cognitive scientist Lucilla Cardinali observes 
that Head and Holmes’s 1911 hypothesis that tool use affects plastic changes in 
the body schema had been widely accepted, despite the absence of proof that the 
schema was actually modified. Cardinali’s own work offers evidence that tool 
use affects motor arm behavior and the perceived length of the arm even after the 
tool is removed.22 Like a tool, the wheelchair theoretically becomes integrated 
into the way the wheelchair user experiences the world, and is as likely as any 
tool to affect plastic changes in the body schema. In her essay on re-embodiment 
for wheelchair users after spinal cord injury, sociologist Christina Papadimitriou 
includes first-person narratives while acknowledging that her subjects experience 
difficulty in verbally expressing “the embodied struggle of incorporating the 
materiality of the wheelchair into one’s general style of being in the world.”23 She 
notes, however, some trends in the narratives of independent-living wheelchair 
users that suggest the incorporation of the wheelchair into the body schema: “I 
put my chair on along with my clothes . . . it’s part of me . . . I forget it,” and, 
“[the chair] is part of me. It’s my other half. My mind is one half, the wheelchair 
is my body.”24 Alice Sheppard, a dancer with AXIS, expresses a similar feeling 
regarding her wheelchair: “It’s not so much a thing as a real body part.”25 These 
samplings are not representative of all wheelchair users, but combined with the 
observation that tool use affects change in the body schema, they suggest that, at 
least in some cases, the wheelchair becomes part of the lived-body experience of 
the world. One of the questions that arises in physically integrated performance 
is whether different lived-body experiences and different experiences of the body 
schema create an obstacle to kinesthetic empathy. 
In her commentary on a 2009 episode of the television series, Glee, the 
disability blogger “Wheelchair Dancer” expresses frustration with what seems to 
be a fundamental kinesthetic misunderstanding. In the episode, the students are 
asked to spend three hours a day in wheelchairs and perform a wheelchair musical 
theatre number to find greater empathy for their disabled peer.  Wheelchair Dancer 
writes:
And then there’s the sad fact of the [wheelchair] “dancing;” 
[sic] the choreography sucks. . . . The rest is notable only for the 
way that it shows that able-bodied, non-wheelchair-using folk 
really do think of chairs as bicycles you move with your arms. 
There’s absolutely no body-chair integration at all. They think 
of sitting in a chair as being only about not being able to move 
their legs (and in Artie’s case as being about having his hips and 
legs twisted to one side). That mistaken understanding leads to 
some very weird looking people in chairs. On chairs would be 
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a better phrase for it. The fake paralysis of their legs somehow 
wends its way up their bodies so that they are really only able 
to push with their elbows (no wonder they have sore arms!).”26
The producers of Glee have already incited a battle with the disabled community 
by casting Kevin McHale, a nondisabled actor, in the role of the wheelchair-
using Artie. Misunderstanding the lived-body experience of disability mars the 
“Wheels” episode, which seems a well-intentioned attempt at inclusiveness. 
And as Wheelchair Dancer points out, that misunderstanding is first a kinesthetic 
misunderstanding. Wheelchair Dancer’s entry shows that for her, the wheelchair 
performance of a non-wheelchair user “feels” wrong. She may be having a feeling 
of kinesthetic empathy (wheelchairs as “bicycles you move with your arms”), 
but it does not match her experience as an actual wheelchair user. McHale’s 
performance of Artie might fit the imaginative experience (a kind of empathy) 
of a nondisabled viewer, in the sense that McHale experiences the wheelchair 
the way any nondisabled person would, but for a “real” wheelchair user, the 
performance is kinesthetically and experientially “wrong” or inauthentic because 
the performers use their muscles and body structure in a way that an actual 
wheelchair user would or could not. Arguably, the producers of Glee and AXIS 
Dance Company are attempting to do the same thing, which is to establish a bond 
of kinesthetic empathy between disabled and nondisabled individuals. While 
Glee’s belief that they could accomplish this bond using nondisabled performers 
is troubling, both the desire and the missing-of-the-mark seem characteristic of 
nondisabled attempts at empathizing with disability. 
When technologies and practices such as the kinesthetic misunderstanding 
of disability are repeated, they are reinforced, which is one of many reasons that 
the Glee episode is problematic.27 If our mirror neuron system responds more 
readily and vigorously to what we already know, then difference, particularly the 
unfamiliar movements of a differently-abled body, may pose a challenge for the 
mirroring system of our premotor cortex. At the same time, watching a (familiar) 
nondisabled person pretending to have a disability might kinesthetically reinforce 
ablist assumptions about the disabled experience of the lived body. Since kinesthetic 
empathy likely engages both nonconscious and conscious processes, we may not 
always be aware of the ways in which our perspectives are being reinforced or 
changed through exposure to movement. The plasticity of the brain allows for 
change, and the act of merely watching the movement of a differently-abled body 
may contribute or instigate change, but it seems clear that the movement watched 
must be authentic to the differently-abled body that performs it.
The material for the ensuing observations is purely qualitative and is drawn 
from my own experience of watching AXIS in performance, from audience 
comments, press materials, and interviews. Much of the commentary is taken 
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from audience members who elected to attend an AXIS Company lecture-
demonstration and/or performance, and to attend a post-show talkback. The 
comments were made by audience members who were invested enough in the 
performance to want to learn more about it, and who self-selected as willing to 
talk about their experience or query the performers about theirs. As such, they 
are not representative of all audience members. This informal collection of 
information offers a preliminary exploration of the experience of kinesthetic 
empathy in physically integrated performance. It cannot definitively determine 
whether watching movement can change us and to what degree, but it is my hope 
that this exploration can point toward a more formal study of kinesthetic empathy 
in physically integrated performance and to strategies for channeling kinesthetic 
empathy more effectively.
AXIS Dance Company
AXIS Dance Company, one of the world’s most acclaimed 
and innovative ensembles of performers with and without 
disabilities, will change the way you think about dance and the 
possibilities of the human body forever. 
    —AXIS Dance Company28
In 1997, AXIS Dance Company entered its eleventh year and shifted its focus 
to become a repertory company. The company mission—to create and perform 
contemporary dance through collaboration with dancers with and without 
disabilities, to challenge traditional definitions of “dance,” “dancer,” and “ability” 
and expand dance to include a community that has been left out of the performing 
arts, to educate, and to promote physically integrated dance—remained the same, 
but the artistic directors began commissioning new work from some of the most 
noteworthy choreographers of the modern dance world, including Bill T. Jones, 
Joe Goode, David Dorfman, Alex Ketley, Kate Weare, Stephen Petronio, and 
others. This choice to become a repertory company raised the company’s profile 
and also put it in the position of having to constantly revisit, revise, and develop 
its movement vocabulary as different choreographers—some who had never 
worked with a physically integrated company before—came into the studio and 
began the process of creating dance for differently-abled dancers. 
Interrogating one’s own movement patterns and exploring the ways we 
embody our experience may always be integral to the choreographic process, 
but these strategies become more significant when the choreographer cannot 
make assumptions about what each dancer and each differently-abled dancer’s 
body can do. Each new choreographer is engaging questions about the nature 
of dance, virtuosity, composition, and kinesthetic empathy for differently-abled 
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bodies, a process related to AXIS’s overall mission. At the same time, the dancers 
are necessarily engaging kinesthetic empathy to understand and execute the 
choreographer’s movement.29 This choreographer-dancer exchange becomes a 
model for the experience of kinesthetic empathy that is intended for the audience 
as well. In some ways, AXIS, with its ever-changing choreographers, may be 
more sensitive to (and more primed for) issues of kinesthetic empathy than a 
company whose work is choreographed by the artistic director or a small pool of 
choreographers. 
AXIS Dance Company in Performance, July 26 and July 30, 2010, Bates 
Dance Festival
The three dances presented by AXIS at the Bates Dance Festival on July 30 
and also excerpted in the lecture demonstration on July 26 were Joe Goode’s 2007 
the beauty that was mine, through the middle, without stopping, Alex Ketley’s 
2008 Vessel, and David Dorfman’s 2009 Light Shelter. This particular performance 
involved four disabled dancers and three non-disabled dancers, and it was clear 
that all the dancers, while differently-abled, were strong, highly trained, virtuosic, 
and expressive in their technique. What was also clear to me as I watched was that 
I was drawn more easily to movement that was familiar to me, either from my 
experience of watching dance or my own dance training and background. 
The movements of the nondisabled dancers were familiar and quickly 
triggered the typical feelings that I have when watching dance, an experience, 
as Ann Daly notes, that is both visual and kinesthetic. I had previously watched 
physically integrated dance, but I had not watched physically integrated dance 
with wheelchair dancers, and it took some time for me to feel a kinesthetic 
connection. I was cognitively engaged because I could evaluate and appreciate 
the choreography and the strength, technique, and performance intensity of the 
wheelchair dancers. I could enjoy the performance. But I had come to watch, 
assuming I would automatically feel a kinesthetic empathic bond because I 
desired one; despite my desire, however, I had to admit to myself that I was caught 
up more in watching than in feeling.
This weak experience of kinesthetic empathy on my part was not consistent 
throughout the performance. As I watched over time, I found powerful moments 
in which I felt connected to all the dancers equally. Those moments invariably 
involved contact duets (a duet in which the dancers are in frequent physical contact 
with each other’s bodies) or the wheelchair dancers using their wheelchairs in (to 
me) radical ways, such as tipping over onto one side and sliding or rotating on the 
floor, tipping forward to balance partially on their hands and pulling themselves 
across the floor, or moving out of the chair completely, perhaps maintaining 
contact with it but often moving independently of it. The wheelchair, theoretically 
a significant aspect of the wheelchair dancer’s lived-body experience, seemed to 
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be an obstacle to my finding a kinesthetic connection to the dancer, except when 
he or she was using it in an unconventional (to me) way. But if the wheelchair is 
part of the wheelchair dancer’s body, what does it mean if my stronger kinesthetic 
response occurred when that part of the body was left behind?
My initial response may be typical. Christina Papadimitriou’s interviews 
with wheelchair users include the follow observations: “People see the wheelchair 
first, then they see the person in the chair” and “If people see the chair first and the 
person second, then all you see is disability.”30 In some cases, from the wheelchair 
user’s perspective, what is seen first by the nondisabled community is the 
wheelchair, the equipment as equipment, and only afterwards the person, or the 
person-and-wheelchair as a whole body. If that is the case, there are any number 
of factors that contribute to it: historically and culturally ingrained beliefs, habit, 
lack of exposure/familiarity with wheelchair users, vocabulary (as Papadimitriou 
notes the difference between thinking of someone as “in” a wheelchair rather than 
being a wheelchair user).31 Can watching the way the wheelchair user dances and 
moves in performance change this way of seeing that seems to be an obstacle to 
feeling?
In my case, yes. I cannot call what happened while watching this AXIS 
performance purely kinesthetic empathy because I was engaging other conscious 
cognitive processes in my desire to monitor my feelings and to increase my 
connection to the performance. I was, ironically, trying to make something 
happen that is presumably automatic and involuntary, and herein lies part of the 
awkwardness of trying to separate and distinguish neural substrates from conscious 
cognition; I was using conscious processes to try to stimulate unconscious ones. 
But it is widely accepted that what have been called top-down and bottom-up 
processes of the brain are reciprocal and by the end of the performance, I felt a 
stronger kinesthetic connection to all of the performers. As I watched, I began to 
identify aspects of the AXIS performance that seemed to strengthen my experience 
of kinesthetic empathy:
1. Contact duets. When a nondisabled dancer whose movements are familiar 
to me physically interacts with the wheelchair dancer, he or she gives me a way 
of accessing an unfamiliar and unpracticed movement vocabulary made by a 
differently-abled body. I may not have a direct feeling of kinesthetic empathy 
with the wheelchair dancer, but I am having a kinesthetically empathic experience 
of dancing with the wheelchair dancer, and this potentially leads me toward 
kinesthetic empathy. In this case, familiar movements are creating a bridge or 
point of contact with unfamiliar movements.
2. Contact duets, part II: Touch. As I noted earlier, Christian Keysers’s work 
hypothesizes the somatosensory cortex, particularly the areas BA2 and SII, as being 
potential sites for mirroring mechanisms, and that touching and being touched 
are also potential places for shared or vicarious experience. Unlike the mirror 
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neuron system in the premotor cortex that seems to prefer familiar movement, the 
hypothetical mirror neuron system of the somatosensory cortex seems less finicky. 
fMRI studies have shown that SII was active both when watching a person being 
touched and an object being touched. Keysers hypothesizes that what is shared 
in this instance is the feeling of being touched.32 If this is the case, then body-to-
body contact and body-to-wheelchair contact are experienced similarly by this 
hypothetical mirroring system in the somatosensory cortex. My own experience 
resonates with this hypothesis. In contact duets, the wheelchair was touched in the 
same way any other part of the body would be touched; firmly, lightly, pushed, 
pulled, caressed. In those moments, I experienced the wheelchair as part of the 
body or bodies involved in the duet rather than as something separate or inorganic 
to the movement. Touch seems capable of transforming the wheelchair from 
equipment to lived body.
I observed similar responses to touch and contact duets in the audience, a 
large percentage of which seemed to have a unified response to a sequence from 
Joe Goode’s the beauty that was mine, through the middle, without stopping. In 
the sequence in question, company dancers Rodney Bell and Sonsherée Giles 
lied on their backs with their legs bent in a sitting position and then rolled over to 
their left side, Bell in a manual wheelchair and Giles without a chair. They lifted 
their upper bodies, making eye contact and seeing each other as they slid across 
the floor, and as Bell paused to lie on his side again, Giles stood and stretched 
out full length across the up-turned, right-side wheel of Bell’s chair and began 
to spin herself gently above him as he slid, rotating beneath her in the opposite 
direction.33 In both the lecture-demonstration and the actual performance, there 
was an audible, collective intake of breath from the audience. Something intense, 
and moving, and intimate had happened, and the audience was profoundly 
connected to it in what seems to have been an immediate and involuntary way. 
It is impossible to know what actually happened to the observer on the neural 
level, but my experience and the experience of much of the audience reflects 
Vischer and Lipps’s use of Einfühlung or “in-feeling” to describe the observer’s 
involuntary, shared, kinesthetic response to the aesthetic experience. Much of 
the audience was kinesthetically responding to a moment of movement that was 
beautiful, and I suggest that part of what made it beautiful and kinesthetically 
shared was the engagement of touch.
3. Using the chair in different orientations. When the wheelchair was in 
an unfamiliar orientation for me (i.e., when a wheelchair dancer was lying on 
his or her side on the floor), I started to experience the wheelchair differently. 
The irony is that the wheelchair, which is a primary component of mobility and 
being-in-the-world for the disabled dancer, became more resonant for me as it 
became less functional. As Christina Papadimitriou notes, a non-wheelchair 
user tends to respond to the wheelchair as a functional piece of equipment, and 
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these strategies within the dance that remove the wheelchair from its obvious 
functionality changed my perception and experience of both the chair and the 
wheelchair dancer. While I may have been merely responding to novelty and 
to the athleticism of the dancer’s technique in these more vigorous movements, 
these elements of the movement vocabulary created a lived-body experience of 
the wheelchair that resisted being read as functional. The movement became 
aesthetic, movement for the sake of movement, in the same way that the dance 
movement of nondisabled dancers is often aesthetic rather than purely functional. 
While many early studies of the mirror neuron system focused on goal-oriented 
movement, it is worth noting that the concept of Einfühlung was first applied to a 
kinesthetic response to an aesthetic experience, not a functional or goal-oriented 
one. One aspect of the interdisciplinary work of dance and cognitive science, and 
of neuroaesthetics in general, is exploring how the aesthetic experience provides 
cognitive opportunities that are different from everyday life. The wheelchair 
dancer’s inventive, nonconventional, aesthetic movements may provide the 
audience member with an entrée to a kinesthetic experience and kinesthetic 
empathy that conventional movement may not. Hypothetically, that shared, if 
unusual, experience in performance could lead to shared experiences in other 
situations as well.
The Awkwardness of the Q & A
A question-and-answer session following a lecture-demonstration or 
performance can be a rich opportunity to discover what the audience is actually 
taking away from the experience, and the degree to which they are empathizing 
with the performers in the sense of feeling what the performers are feeling. It can 
also be filled with painfully awkward moments when the shared experience is 
not as successful as hoped, and when a divide remains between the performer’s 
experience and that of the audience. I attended two AXIS question-and-answer 
sessions at the Bates Dance Festival, one following the lecture-demonstration on 
July 26 and one following the July 30 performance. 
The audience for the question-and-answer sessions was a mix of people of 
different physical abilities, but those who actively participated or offered questions 
to the company, seemed to be people without visible disabilities. At the first 
session, an audience member gave the most empathic comment of the evening, 
saying he was already excited about choreographing for the company. Most of 
the other responses over the course of the two Q & A’s, however, characterized 
us as audiences still caught in oppositional distinctions between disabled and 
nondisabled. While the company was thanked and applauded by the Q & A 
participants, the compliments were slightly characterized as what Wheelchair 
Dancer refers to in her blog as cringe-worthy:34 A dancer in the audience thanked 
the company because she now knew, if anything ever happened to her body, 
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she would still be able to dance. Another audience member complimented the 
company on its amazing performance, saying that she thought it was going to be 
scary, but it wasn’t. Other questions included: Do you ever forget your limitations 
while you are dancing or imagine that you can reach beyond them?  Do the non-
wheelchair dancers worry about being run over?  Have you ever considered having 
a Metropolis-like industrial set, with wheels, so that the wheelchairs would fit in? 
How do you distinguish between doing “tricks” and dancing?
It is an inevitable part of performance that when one performs, one makes 
oneself available to the audience for a kind of consumption. After an hour and a 
half of performance in which the audience has had permission to watch as much 
as they please, they have a sense of intimacy with the performers, a sense of 
knowing them, and they will ask questions and feel permitted to ask questions 
that they might not ask in other contexts. This sense of familiarity may be related 
to kinesthetic empathy, but it seems to be part of a more complex relationship of 
consumption and ownership that is outside the bounds of this essay to address. 
The audience at this performance—like all audiences—is not a homogenous unit, 
but a group of diverse individuals, however, the questions asked characterize and 
represent us as a collective unit in this moment. Our questions suggest that there 
is a gap between what we, as an audience, had kinesthetically experienced, and 
what the dancers felt and intended to share with us. However, the questions also 
suggest that we have a strong desire to make a connection with the performers. 
It is clear that we want to understand. The questions we ask are awkward and 
possibly offensive, and our ignorance is certainly a cultural ignorance, but once 
again, I suggest that it is a kinesthetic ignorance as well.
The “trick” question, perhaps, best illustrates the complex fusing of cultural 
and kinesthetic ignorance that forms an obstacle to kinesthetic empathy, and the 
way both factors influence the perceptions of performers and audience. Calling 
something a “trick” suggests a disconnection or alienation from the movement—a 
trick is something purposefully made to look difficult or virtuosic. A trick is 
not authentic or honest. An example of a wheelchair dance movement that is 
sometimes perceived as a “trick” by non-wheelchair users is the “wheelie.”  Some 
physically integrated dance companies, such as New York-based Infinity Dance 
Theatre, have removed the wheelie from their dance vocabulary for this very 
reason.35 The perception of wheelie-as-trick seems most associated with an ablist 
perspective that views the wheelchair as prop or equipment rather than a part of 
the body. Papadimitriou’s research on the rehabilitation of wheelchair users with 
spinal cord injuries offers an alternative view from the perspective of wheelchair 
users and disability therapists:
A “wheelie” is the technique of balancing the wheelchair on its 
back two wheels, and it is a term that both staff and patients use. 
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Staff recommends that SCI in-patients who use non-electrical 
wheelchairs learn to balance in that position for at least one 
minute. Teaching patients to do “wheelies” serves, ostensibly, 
the purpose of being able to “bump” curbs or maneuver 
inclines. Doing a wheelie requires upper body and arm strength 
in order for the user to lift the wheelchair onto the two back 
wheels and balance in that position. Learning to do wheelies 
is an exercise during physical therapy that manual wheelchair 
users are expected to have mastered before discharge. It is part 
of the clients’ re-embodiment practices.36
The wheelie means something different for a wheelchair user than it does for a 
non-wheelchair user; as Papadimitriou notes, the wheelie makes certain aspects 
of embodied life possible that would otherwise not be possible and it must be 
successfully performed in order for a new wheelchair user to be discharged from 
a rehabilitation setting. It is a fundamental movement of the manual wheelchair 
vocabulary, and its presence and meaning in the context of wheelchair dance has 
a different significance than a non-wheelchair user might attribute to it. 
When the participant in the question-and-answer session asked the “trick” 
question, all of the dancers agreed that this issue is always a danger in all forms 
of dance. Is the ability to do thirty-two-plus fouettés an act of virtuosity or a trick 
for the ballet dancer?  It is a subjective interpretation based on prior experience, 
context, factors—such a music and musicality—and kinesthetic empathy. The same 
is true for wheelies and great shows of strength and dexterity for the wheelchair 
dancer. The audience participant’s question suggests that he was seeing tricks, not 
dance. Is there something the dancers and choreographers can do to help shift his 
subjective experience?   Is it a question of being exposed to more wheelchair dance 
in order to become familiar enough with the movement vocabulary to differentiate 
trick from artistry?  Or is it a question of sharing information: Does knowing that 
a wheelie is one of the fundamental parts of wheelchair movement vocabulary 
change that perception?   The wheelie is an authentic movement, not a trick, but 
the audience member’s misperception may not be remediable through watching 
alone. It may require a more volitional and conscious aspect of cognition, or new 
kinesthetic information to change his experience of the dance.
Conclusion, or Seeing Is Not Necessarily Mirroring
Shaun Gallagher observes that when we hypothesize the mirroring of 
movement (kinesthetic empathy) as automatic, we find ourselves unable 
to distinguish movement perception and movement simulation as separate 
processes.37 If mirroring is automatic and integral to human brain behavior, then, 
indeed, perceiving movement and vicariously experiencing it become the same 
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event. In the experience of watching physically integrated dance, however, it is 
clear that in some cases seeing is not mirroring or simulating, or at least it is not 
a simulation with any accuracy to the original experience. Phenomenologically, 
perceiving is not always the simulation of doing, even if there are mechanisms in 
our brain that tell us that it is. 
In terms of kinesthetic empathy and, perhaps, all forms of empathy, we are 
always limited by our own first-person experience, as both phenomenologists and 
cognitive scientists have observed. When we watch another’s movement, what 
we simulate is our own experience of the movement, not the experience of the 
other. There will always be a gap between what we perceive and what we experi-
ence. And while it is more pleasant to imagine that the cognitive mechanisms of 
empathy allow us to truly connect with one another, instead of giving us a very 
convincing illusion of connecting with one another, knowing that we are always 
missing the mark is useful information for strengthening empathic bonds. One of 
the great obstacles to understanding differently-abled bodies (from both ablist and 
disabled persons’ perspectives) is that we already assume that we do understand. 
In all likelihood, the producers of Glee and the audience participants in the AXIS 
Q & A have no idea that their understanding of differently-abled bodies in perfor-
mance is inaccurate. Their sense of kinesthetic empathy, which is based on what 
they know and have experienced, is telling them that they do understand, effort-
lessly and automatically. It is possible that through repeated and careful observa-
tion, we might begin to pick up pieces of kinesthetic information that would begin 
to adjust the accuracy of our shared experience. But that possibility becomes more 
probable if we know we need to look for our misperceptions. 
AXIS Dance Company and many other physically integrated performance 
companies do not rely solely on watching performance as a strategy for changing 
perceptions about disability and differently-abled bodies. Performance takes a 
central role because it is a way to reach a large number of people. But workshops, 
outreach programs, and community and professional classes that allow dancers 
and nondancers, both disabled and nondisabled, to work together on movement 
projects offer more experiential approaches to developing empathy, and these 
kinds of experiences promote an understanding and awareness that is kinesthetic 
as well as cultural. In addition, question-and-answer sessions provide information 
that influences conscious cognitive processes that can, in turn, help to inform 
and shape an experience of kinesthetic empathy. The automatic experience of 
kinesthetic empathy is very likely a factor in how we understand and experience 
both physical difference and physical similarity. But if that automatic experience 
is providing inaccurate information, we have the resources to adjust the experience 
through the reciprocal relationship of conscious and nonconscious cognitive 
processes. The more we understand about the limits and potential of kinesthetic 
empathy, the more we can mine this gap between our own experiences and those 
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of others and use that information to strengthen our empathic relationships.
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